Num artigo chamado THE PROBLEM OF EVIL para bethinking.org, Lane Craig
God could not have created a world that had so much good as the actual world but had less evil, both in terms of quantity and quality; and, moreover, God has morally sufficient reasons for permitting the evil that exists.The 'could not' in (5) should be understood to mean that such a world is infeasible for God. There are doubtless logically possible worlds which are sinless and exceed the actual world in goodness, but such worlds may not be feasible for God. So long as this explanation is even possible, it proves that God and the evil in the world are logically compatible.The difficulty with this further move emerges when we recall the distinction between epistemic and metaphysical possibility discussed in connection with the ontological argument. While (5) is clearly epistemically possible (for all we know, it may be true), the atheist might insist that it has not been shown that (5) is metaphysically possible (that there is a possible world where  is true). The atheist could insist that perhaps (1) and (5) are after all logically incompatible in some way which we cannot discern. Perhaps in every possible world in which God exists the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom which are true in that world permit Him to create a world having more good but less evil than the actual world. Now this might strike us as an extraordinarily bold hypothesis; indeed, most atheists today do concede that (5) is metaphysically possible. Nonetheless, the dogmatic atheist cannot be forced, it seems, from his stronghold.